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BACKGROUND 
Safer Clinical Systems is the Health Foundation’s new five year programme of work to test and demonstrate 
ways to improve healthcare systems and processes, to develop safer systems that improve patient safety. It 
builds on learning from the Safer Patients Initiative (SPI) and models of system improvement from both 
healthcare and other industries. 
Learning from the SPI highlighted the need to take a clinical systems approach to improving safety. SPI 
highlighted that many hospitals struggle to implement improvement in clinical areas due to inherent 
problems with support mechanisms. Clinical processes and systems, rather than individuals, are often the 
contributors to breakdown in patient safety. The Safer Clinical Systems programme aimed to measure the 
reliability of clinical processes, identify defects within those processes, and identify the systems that result in 
those defects. Methods to improve system reliability were then to be tested and re-developed in order to 
reduce the risk of harm being caused to patients. Such system-level awareness should lead to improvements 
in other patient care pathways. 
The relationship between system reliability and actual harm is challenging to identify and measure. Specific, 
well-defined, small-scale processes have been used in other programmes, and system reliability has been 
shown to have a direct causal relationship with harm (e.g. care bundle compliance in an intensive care unit 
can reduce the incidence of ventilator-associated pneumonia). However, it has become evident that harm 
can be caused by a variety of factors over time; when working in broader, more complex and dynamic 
systems, change in outcome can be difficult to attribute to specific improvements and difficulties are also 
associated with relating evidence to resulting harm.  
The overall aim of Phase 1 of the Safer Clinical Systems programme was to demonstrate proof-of-concept 
that using a systems-based approach could contribute to improved patient safety. In Phase 1, experienced 
NHS teams from four locations worked together with expert advisers to co-design the Safer Clinical Systems 
programme.  
WHY A SYSTEMS APPROACH? 
We know from the “How safe are clinical systems?” research (WISER, 2010) that processes of care are 
unreliable, and that there is great variation in practice between teams, services and organisations. This 
variation leads to differences in patient outcome and has the potential to lead to errors and increase the risk 
of harm. It is now widely recognised that errors and human behaviour cannot be understood in isolation, but 
must be considered in the context or system in which people are working; this is as true for healthcare as it 
is for other safety-critical industries. Clinical staff are influenced by a wide range of system factors such as: 
the available technology, team and staffing levels, their hours of work, the design of work areas, workplace 
distractions and patient factors. Wider evidence shows that this can be due to: 
 A lack of agreed standardised practice, roles and responsibilities. 
 Poor understanding of where errors occur and where risk lies. 
 Poor appreciation of risk, errors and harm. 
 A lack of systems to identify risk and harm and poor reporting systems.  
 A lack of feedback loops to address errors that have occurred, and a concomitant lack of learning. 
 Poor sustainability of new initiatives and changes.  
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 Poor teamwork and a lack of willingness to challenge the system when risks are apparent. 
 The healthcare system requiring numerous handovers of patient information and responsibility for care. 
Current thinking recognises the fact that adverse events or patient safety incidents are generally the result 
of a plethora of events or failures within the healthcare system, in which human error is usually the final 
element. This is demonstrated by the well-known and influential model of accident causation, Reason’s 
Swiss-Cheese analogy. This model acknowledges that inadequacies in the systems within which people work 
make human error and unsafe acts more likely. The latent conditions that contribute to error include factors 
such as: understaffing, unclear allocation of responsibility, poor supervision, and inadequate processes for 
maintaining equipment.  
Rather than waiting until an adverse event or harm occurs and then retrospectively identifying a root cause, 
an alternative approach prospectively identifies the numerous factors that might result in patient harm. The 
Safer Clinical Systems programme explored methods of establishing care systems within a culture able to 
address unsafe processes and proactively manage risk. By taking a systems approach, healthcare staff can 
start to define those parts of a clinical care process that might compromise safety, and then look for 
solutions to minimise the associated risk. Aspects of the clinical care process that compromise safety may 
occur at any point along the patient journey in primary or secondary care; the approach aims to highlight 
steps where risks are apparent and identify means of improving them. Several processes within healthcare 
impact on a high proportion of patient journeys e.g. medication management, infection screening, clinical 
testing, and information flow within and across organisational boundaries (between-ward transfer, referral 
from primary to secondary care). This means focusing not only on clinical care but also on the systems that 
support care. 
Systems in this context exist to achieve particular goals, in this case to deliver clinical care. It is important to 
recognise that systems comprise more than individuals and their working practices; a system encompasses a 
set of interacting elements including people and technology, described as a ’socio-technical system‘. The 
systems approach recognises that individuals exist and behave within a wider context: systems have 
boundaries with some elements perceived as within the system and some elements as outside; however, 
boundaries are not absolute and movement across them renders the system responsive to outside forces 
and wider or adjacent systems. Feedback loops between systems add additional fluidity.  
A total system is, therefore, difficult to define but can be thought of as being made up of subsystems or 
subunits. Each subsystem is a system in its own right, and contains its own elements working and interacting 
with each other. Crucially, a system’s behaviour should be understood as arising from the relationships 
across and between its parts rather than from the individual parts in isolation. In healthcare and in building 
safer clinical systems, it is important to recognise how the system’s context influences its performance; this 
requires that contextual factors that affect system performance be identified. 
AIM OF THE SAFER CLINICAL SYSTEMS PROGRAMME 
The aim of the Safer Clinical Systems programme is to increase reliability in systems of care, thereby 
reducing the number of failures that result in harm to patient. 
Most safety improvement initiatives have been developed in response to a practical need or an actual 
system failure. Learning how to improve has, therefore, involved a reactive approach to correcting system 
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weaknesses, rather than applying new logic to the proactive design of systems for optimal safety and 
continuous improvement. In addition, the current approach to system performance has focused on local 
needs and the application of tactical tools borrowed from the manufacturing sector.  
Focusing on the improvement of specific tasks and activities within a single element of the healthcare 
system is limited in its scope; improvements may result in better completion of the specific task but this 
improvement is unlikely to impact on the whole system. The modern challenge is to improve entire clinical 
systems to make them safer, and to stimulate processes that allow staff to learn how to improve both the 
system and function. As such, Safer Clinical Systems has two dimensions, improving the effectiveness of the 
entire system and increasing the reliability of individual elements within the system.  
The foundation of the Safer Clinical Systems approach is the combination of methods of safety 
management, human factors engineering and the development of improved reliable organisations, by 
using learning and value-focused approaches. Generating processes that are both improved and more 
reliable goes beyond the achievements that can be engendered at the tactical or the tool level; it embraces 
the optimal design of systems with in-built resilience, and encourages situational awareness that is sensitive 
to underperformance and deviation. These specialist fields of knowledge rely on both scientific method and 
team engagement, and have been applied to various industrial (petrochemical, nuclear and aerospace) 
sectors. In healthcare, Safer Clinical Systems is the amalgam of these specialist knowledge bases, applied 
end-to-end across the process with the intention of reducing the harm associated with latent errors in 
clinical system design. Safer Clinical Systems goes beyond the best practices of individual clinical 
departments, to create a system and network of improvement activities that are grounded in the application 
of safety engineering and improvement. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE SAFER CLINICAL SYSTEMS PROGRAMME 
The objectives of the Safer Clinical System Programme are to: 
i) Improve the reliability of clinical systems used in healthcare and so reduce patient harm, initially in the 
organisations participating in Phase 1 of the programme and over time extending the process more 
widely across healthcare.  
ii) Develop a faculty of experts to support those in the UK who work to improve clinical systems for patient 
safety; this will help to build internal capacity for improvement within the NHS as a whole. 
iii) Develop well-described, specified interventions to improve patient safety.  
iv) Develop a UK-wide evidence base for the application of clinical systems improvement.  
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METHODOLOGY 
The Health Foundation’s Safer Clinical Systems programme was piloted in five NHS Trusts in four locations. 
Each Trust chose an area where system factors were known to result in a safety issue and focused attention 
on understanding, measuring and improving reliability in that area. The Safer Clinical Systems interventions 
were developed through a co-design process involving the sites, staff from the Health Foundation and a 
University of Warwick based technical support team (consisting of healthcare, human factors and 
improvement specialists). 
The programme was characterised by a prospective approach to patient safety, as distinct from the reactive 
approach commonly seen in NHS risk management where failings are identified retrospectively and 
addressed after the event. In Safer Clinical Systems, there was an explicit requirement to develop a ‘safety 
case’ for the system, through proactive understanding and risk management.  
Phase 1 of Safer Clinical Systems programme was designed to prove that the approach could be used to 
increase reliability in care processes and reduce the number of failures that result in patient harm. An initial 
planning workshop in September 2008 defined the aims of the project and the outline of how it would be 
executed. These aspects were further developed with the sites at the initiation workshop in October 2008. 
The programme then ran a series of two day workshops, approximately every two months, to promote 
specific learning and share ideas and progress. Each site also had a human factors workshop. Projects were 
supported locally at each site by a coordinator from the support team, who provided expertise on 
improvement and safety methodologies.  
In order to develop this new methodology an iterative approach was required, with ideas developed during 
the course of the project being fully explored. This involved a divergent-convergent approach whereby the 
scope of projects expanded to allow exploration and then converged to develop focussed interventions. 
The impact of the projects was principally measured by assessing the reliability of the target systems. 
Evaluative evidence was sought that was loosely based on the elements of Realistic Evaluation, which 
considers: the context in which changes take place, the mechanisms or processes expected to produce 
change and the outcomes that can be measured. The original plan for measurement was to develop a 
template similar to that used in the SPI. As projects progressed the sites developed a range of measures and 
a template was then devised in conjunction with site B. The iterative approach to each project has meant 
that it was not possible to stipulate measures to be used at the onset; at several sites the planned 
assessment measures changed as projects developed. Each site developed a data collection system that 
fitted within their existing healthcare system. During the course of the programme each site also developed 
and maintained an ongoing Safety Improvement Case (SIC). This SIC was based on the safety case design 
used in other sectors and consists of a narrative, supported by data, to describe the project and how it 
improves reliability and therefore how it minimises risk and would be expected to reduce harm. 
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PROJECTS AND LEARNING FROM THE SITES 
SITE A  
Site A initially proposed work on three high-risk areas for Phase 1 of the Safer Clinical Systems programme, 
comprising: transfer of clinical information, medication errors and pressure ulcers. The Acute Trust has a 
well-developed system for undertaking improvement work, into which they aimed to incorporate the Safer 
Clinical Systems programme; a deliberate decision was made to not present the Safer Clinical Systems 
programme as different from ongoing initiatives. 
Scoping 
Scoping of the project resulted in several changes in focus:  
The initial scoping exercise, conducted in April 2009, used the Global Trigger Tool (GTT) to establish a 
baseline measurement of harm. The hypothesis was that medication errors would prove to be the priority 
area for improvement. However, GTT analysis identified the key issue for healthcare economy as being 
related to patient readmission; there is recognition that patients who are readmitted have a high incidence 
of safety incidents. As a result, it was decided that the Safer Clinical Systems programme would focus on the 
transfer of clinical information along the length of the patient pathway from admission to discharge, and 
assess any relationship with readmission. The aim of the project was formulated as being to assess the 
accuracy and effectiveness of communication of clinical information and handover of care across the 
healthcare economy; it focussed on complex care pathways in adults aged over 65 years who entered the 
urgent care system out-of-hours. 
In August 2009 a key objective was stated to be: improving the handover and communication of care across 
the pathway and healthcare economy and reducing harm by 50% 
Project aim 
In November 2009 the project aim was further refined as being to reduce by 50% the actual harm from the 
transfer of clinical information year on year in the urgent care pathway.  
The project identified specific goals of: 
 Ensuring that accurate, complete and timely clinical information was conveyed, between process steps, 
to the appropriate team/individual. 
 Improving the reliability and safe transfer of clinical information between organisations/departments.  
 Adapting and integrating new tools across the system, and using them to measure and action 
improvements in areas of potential harm. 
 Encouraging care teams to recognise the importance of patient handover to allow them to design, buy 
into and sustain improvement.  
 Encouraging departments to learn and introduce new working practices. 
 Sharing project outcomes in a workbook for use in other areas of the organisation, to indicate where 
they are in terms of their safety culture. 
© University of Warwick  Page 6 of 29 
 
Interventions and measurement tools used 
A range of methodologies was used as part of the Safer Clinical Systems programme at site A : 
1. A standardised out-of-hours form was designed for GPs to complete when referring a patient into 
hospital, and has been rolled out across the out-of-hours system.  
2. An audit of the completeness and timeliness of documentation conducted by ambulance services 
bringing patients into A&E showed this aspect of information transfer to be good.  
3. The efficiency of coding blood tests performed on patients in A&E, was assessed to ensure that 
appropriate tests were requested and to optimise the speed of reporting.  
4. The SBAR tool (situation, background, assessment, recommendation) with Teach-back (SBART) was 
introduced for the transfer of patients from A&E to assessment/observation wards.  
5. An audit was undertaken to look at the effectiveness of selection of patients from A&E to enter the PCT-
owned  Community Unit. Decision trees were introduced to assist the process.  
6. Paperwork used during the handover of patients from the  Community Unit to the Intermediate Care 
Home was streamlined.  
7. An audit was undertaken to find out how often GPs received updated medication information when 
patients were discharged from the Intermediate Care Home to home.   
8. A project looked at the correspondence sent to GPs on patient discharge.  
The reliability of the system was assessed in terms of patient flow through the local health economy, using 
several measures. Measures of project success considered: how many times patients appeared in A&E 
accompanied by the standard out-of-hours form; and the time elapsed between blood sampling and the 
results of the test being read by the clinician, which decreased from 228 minutes in October 2009 to 59 
minutes in February 2010. 
Other initiatives 
A number of other ongoing projects at site A indicated a spread of the Safer Clinical Systems effects: a 
process of designing-in safety was applied to systems in the newly rebuilt Community Unit; the maternity 
unit applied an SBAR-T project to develop a new method for recording Apgar scores in newborns, this was a 
prime example of a rapid human factor intervention that used consensus groups to assess and manage risk 
and provide procedural support.  
Other assessments of change conducted during the Safer Clinical Systems programme included: 
 Safety environment assessment, which identified communication as a key area for improvement. 
 A pilot questionnaire showing that individuals recognised changes in their individual approach to safety 
but less change on an organisation-wide basis. 
 A PCT-wide review of documentation highlighted forms in need of updating, to capture more patient 
data and allow tracking of key indicators. 
 The planned work on medication errors and pressure ulcers was scaled down due to the change in 
project emphasis but some data were collected. 
The trust expressed the desire to reduce readmission rates, and has recognised that one component of 
improvement may be to target information flow. 
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Specific emerging learning 
Emerging learning within the health economy included recognition of the importance of tools such as GTT 
for detecting harm and raising awareness; in addition Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was 
accepted as a new risk assessment tool.  
Initial assumptions as to the causes of safety issues were often incorrect and Safer Clinical Systems 
programme tools were key to identifying true areas of concern; however, during assessment it was noted 
that the existing datasets were often not fit for the purpose required of Safer Clinical Systems and a more 
qualitative approach was needed. 
Perceived challenges 
A project manager identified concerns over the time spent completing paperwork to feedback on project 
work, some of which may duplicate existing reporting mechanisms.  The pre-existence of a large 
improvement programme has made it difficult to identify the specific contribution of the Safer Clinical 
Systems programme in site A and to have measures specific to SCS. 
SITE B 
This project focussed on creating a demonstrably safe medication system by identifying and controlling 
relevant risks to an acceptable level, continuously monitoring performance, and creating resilience to allow 
the system to withstand unforeseen disturbances. 
Project aim 
The project aimed to reduce the occurrence of medication errors and omissions, with the aim of an 
improving prescribing reliability for emergency medical patients to 95%.  
The hypothesis at the outset of the project was that medication administration would have the highest error 
rate, but it was found that NHS incident reporting (IR1) forms did not provide sufficient information to 
identify the cause of errors and progress this aspect. Scoping of the project was facilitated by the use of 
techniques such as process mapping and "create & detect" matrices, and identified prescribing as unreliable. 
Training in human factors showed that the occurrence of errors was inevitable, and that it was more 
important to address the safety and resilience of prescribing systems and focus on proactive risk-
management. As a result, the project aim was modified to stipulate the development of a model prescribing 
system that was reliable, safe and resilient.  
Assessment methodologies used 
Methods used to identify problem areas included: 
1. Identification of value-adding, non value-adding and mitigation steps by process mapping, hierarchical 
task analysis (HTA), observation and interviews.  
2. Identification of the root causes of safety problems using ‘create and detect’ matrices. 
3. Identification of contributory factors using Fishbone analysis. 
4. Validation of the findings using focus groups. 
5. Identification of performance-influencing factors using scenarios.  
6. Prioritisation of risk using FMEA.  
7. Identification of markers of resilience.  
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Assessment highlighted 10 common areas where systems were failing, of which three were selected for the 
focus of the project; these comprised: poor information flow, lack of training and procedural support and an 
absence of feedback concerning prescribing errors. 
Interventions and measurement tools used 
The team applied the following interventions during the course of the Safer Clinical Systems programme: 
1. Pharmacist support was introduced to the post-take ward round (the first ward round following 
emergency admission); this resulted in very positive feedback from junior doctors and is being 
continued indefinitely.  
2. Pharmacy induction training for junior doctors was redesigned, based on awareness of human factors 
training received as part of the Safer Clinical Systems programme.  
3. An antibiotic crib card was introduced, targeting junior doctors, that reiterated key messages from 
antibiotic prescribing policy.  
4. Feedback on prescribing errors made by junior doctors was implemented, to generate a feedback loop 
to assist learning.  
Assessment of the reliability, safety and resilience of the system was primarily informed by auditing the 
prescribing accuracy:  
 Prescribing reliability (the proportion of prescription items that did not require pharmacist intervention) 
increased from 79% in November 2008 to 87% by April 2010. Since then, reliability has fluctuated, 
emphasising the need to address sustainability. 
 Monitoring of the number of patients bringing in their own medicines into hospital was introduced, 
with the optimal situation being for all patients to bring in their own medication. In October 2009 61% 
of patients brought their own medicines into hospital, which rose slightly to 64% by February 2010, and 
has remained around 55-60% since then. 
 The number of GP faxes listing patient’s drugs sent to accompany patients may have increased, with 
28% of GPs providing a complete, accurate medication history for surgical admissions in November 
2009 and 87% of medical admissions arriving with a full drug history in February 2010; it was not 
possible to directly compare surgical and medical results. 
 Pharmacy induction training received very positive feedback from junior doctors in August 2009, and 
questionnaire will be repeated in August 2010.  
 The system of providing feedback on prescribing errors received a very positive response when assessed 
in January 2010. 
Other audits and questionnaires performed include: assessment of the number of pharmacist prescribing 
reconciliations made within 24 hours of patient admission and obtaining feedback on the utility of the 
antibiotic crib card. Training needs have been identified and action plans developed. 
Transferability 
The spread of the Safer Clinical Systems approach to the wider organisation is evidenced by: the request 
from the Trust Board that reporting on medication errors be presented at future Board meetings; and 
expression of interest in using the Proactive Risk Monitoring (PRIMO) tool by other parts of the Trust.  
 
© University of Warwick  Page 9 of 29 
 
Specific emerging learning 
Emerging learning with respect to site B identified that current incident reporting mechanisms fail to capture 
or provide information suited to learning; the Safer Clinical Systems programme showed that qualitative 
information can be more useful for guiding aspects of system change. 
The study team perceived that the Safer Clinical Systems project reduced the risk of prescribing errors as:  
risks had been systematically identified and assessed; appropriate risk control measures had been 
introduced and tested; performance was monitored continuously; and educational programmes were used 
to raise awareness and enhance safety culture. 
Perceived challenges 
Difficulties were noted when undertaking the project in a unit where staff changed regularly; this created 
difficulties with embedding new working systems. In addition, it was felt that though junior doctors know 
what they should be doing the inherent organisational system sometimes prevents them from doing it.  
SITE C  
This project focussed on creating a demonstrably safe system of information flow to support patient care.  
Project aim 
The original vision was to deliver a core data set, with minimal missing or incomplete information. However 
it became apparent that multiple sets of notes were often available for individual patients, as a result of 
carry-over from the old multi-trust structure and resulting from duplicate registrations in the patient 
administration system; clinician interviews identified two perceived main barriers to delivering a core data 
set as the presence of duplicate electronic patient records in the patient management system and problems 
with case note availability in the clinic. As a result the project aimed to:  
1. Increase the availability of relevant clinical information in outpatient clinics. 
2. Reduce the incidence of new duplicate records in the patient management system  across the 
University Hospitals Division, 
3. Implement ongoing monitoring to ensure that creation of new duplicate records remained at a reduced 
and manageable level. 
Assessment methodologies used 
Diagnosis of the issues associated with the project involved: extensive analysis of data relating to duplicate 
patient registrations; task and error mode analysis; literature review; stakeholder consultation and 
consensus development of core data bundle; analysis of local risk management information; and full human 
factors analysis. In addition HTA, risk assessment, failure mode analysis and Performance-Influencing Factor 
analysis were used to construct a 3-site risk evaluation. 
Interventions and measurement tools used 
Measurement parameters assessed the accuracy of patient registration in terms of the incidence of 
registration errors and duplicate entries. Over the course of the project, registration errors fell by nearly 8%, 
although some of this improvement was due to a re-design in maternity registrations in Q2 and not 
attributable to Safer Clinical Systems. The lowest number of new duplicates recorded was seen in February 
2010; the proportion of correct registrations rose from 74% in April 2008, to a consistent 90%+ since 
October 2009; this reduction is despite the number of patient registrations per month increasing by over 
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1,900, and despite the number of new users increasing by 200 with the rollout of the patient management 
system Community module. Current work is addressing the issue of those users who register the fewest 
patients generating the most registration errors. 
Transferability 
Spread of the project beyond its original remit is evidenced by: the identification of merging issues between 
the Labs and PACS interfaces which affect the availability of investigation results; the closing of loopholes at 
the patient management system -PACS interface; establishment of good working relationships between 
Training, Operational Effectiveness and Health Records staff; and raised awareness of human factors.  
Spread of the project to include participation by clerical staff has been particularly effective and has moved 
patient safety initiatives into the non-clinical domain; non-clinical staff participating in the human factors 
day were enlightened and highly motivated by recognising their role in improving patient safety.  
Specific emerging learning 
Emerging learning with respect to information flow systems has demonstrated that those individuals who 
register the most have the lowest error rates; as a result departments where registration is limited to a few 
clerical staff have the lowest error rates. In addition, the project has provided insight into the scope required 
for interface testing. 
Perceived challenges 
The provision of regular feedback regarding the occurrence of new duplicate registrations is recognised as 
key to the effectiveness of the project. The concern is that without regular feedback duplicate registrations 
are likely to increase again.  
The effectiveness of Safer Clinical Systems programme training initiatives was compromised by a high 
turnover of staff. 
SITE D  
Project aim 
The aims of the project were to create a demonstrably safe and reliable patient handover system within 
neurology to achieve safer care, and to develop a general methodology for handover of responsibility 
(horizontal handover) enhancing care. Handover of patient information was felt to be a major issue for at 
least three reasons: 
1. Staff reports expressed concerns over continuity of care. 
2. National Patient Safety Agency data identify failures in communication (of which handovers are a 
special case) as contributing to 70% of adverse events. 
3. The changing organisational context of the Trust, in particular recent changes to working time 
legislation, have led to an increase in the number of location, staff, team and shift changes in the 
patient journey. 
Scoping 
The initial scope of the project (November 2008) was the handover of patients from the Medical Assessment 
Unit to four medical wards. However it was subsequently decided that handover to four wards would be too 
complex for the initial part of project. It was decided to retain a focus on the medical take and handover to 
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the Neurology Unit was selected, as it represents a discrete subset of acute medicine, had established 
clinical buy-in to the project, and was accustomed to implementing improvement initiatives. The 
department receives five to six new patients a day, providing a good number of new handovers for 
observation. Medical handovers between attending-to-attending consultants in neurology were chosen as 
the initial test case, as the process was seen as unstructured and having low reliability. This was seen as a 
test case for the wider system of medical handovers within the Trust, with a view that learning would be 
transferable to other clinical areas. In January 2009, the project scope was specified as focusing improving 
handover to the Neurology Unit for patients with suspected or diagnosed stroke admitted via the 
unscheduled care route.  
The scope of the project was again revised in August 2009 to consider medical handover (physician-to-
physician) of patients admitted to the Neurology Unit via the unscheduled care pathway.  
Assessment methodologies used 
The techniques used to assess reliability of information transfer comprised: detailed observation of nursing 
and medical handovers; shadowing of medical staff at all levels; documentation review; process mapping of 
the pathway traversed by patients; structured and semi-structured interviews; case note review; in-depth 
case studies; HTA of the handover process; and documentation of the current situation with system and 
contextual factor analysis. 
Priority areas were identified as: 
 Creation of core dataset specifying the content of the handover to enable reliable patient care, with 
stakeholder consultation guiding the requirements of the dataset. 
 Criticality analysis of the dataset. 
 Design of handover methodology (process). 
 Measurement of the reliability of handover of the dataset. 
 Measurement of the reliability of supporting tools such as the patient list. 
 Application of the methodology to other horizontal handovers. 
 Development of a clinical value framework to structure handover content. 
 Management of performance-influencing factors during handover. 
 Extension of the process to other handovers. 
Interventions and measurement tools used 
 A handover support tool (aide memoire) was developed with input from stakeholders, and was introduced 
in October 2009. A system of a weekly e-mail was established in February 2010 to feed back data on 
performance to the neurology team, these detailed key learning points and run charts of key measures.  
Reliability of handover was assessed in terms of the proportion of the of core dataset discussed at attending-
to-attending handover. Reliability increased from 35% of core dataset being discussed in June 2009, prior to 
implementation of the handover support tool, to a mean of 83% being discussed in February 2010, and has 
remained around 80% since then.  Variability in reliability initially increased, probably due to the number of 
individuals involved, but has since decreased possibly as a result of the regular feedback provided. 
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Transferability 
It was decided that the handover methodology should be rolled out to a second specialty and the Safer 
Clinical Systems Delivery Group considered proposals from four specialities expressing an interest in being 
the second local test site (A&E, Acute Medicine, Neurosurgery and Critical Care). In April 2010 the Delivery 
Group decided to extend the work to the A&E Department; the Delivery Group were keen that a handover 
methodology be embedded in the end-to-end patient pathway, and introducing the system at the hospital 
entry point (A&E) should be beneficial in achieving this goal. The Safer Clinical Systems team were confident 
that the department showed a high degree of commitment to the methodology and had identified a multi-
disciplinary team. The Group agreed to offer support to the other interested specialties either through other 
work programmes or on a small scale basis. Work started with A&E in August, when the Safer Clinical 
Systems team began process mapping, observation and risk ranking of the different handovers within the 
department to identify critical areas. 
The Safer Clinical Systems approach to patient handover generated by the project has also been transferred 
to the Handover in Hospital at Night (H@N) initiative in site C. Anecdotal reports indicate that the approach 
has received widespread support, and is recognised as novel and directly applicable to the site C setting. 
Specific emerging learning 
The Safer Clinical Systems programme team initially received negative responses from some clinicians 
concerning the concept of standardisation; standardisation was seen by some as analogous to ‘tick box’ 
medicine and as compromising clinical autonomy.  
Emerging learning with respect to healthcare processes identified a lack of clinical standards, without which 
managing the system and providing useful feedback on current working and potential improvements is 
difficult. The development of explicit standards within the Safer Clinical Systems project meant that there 
was a foundation on which teams could start to develop shared understanding as to how the handover 
system should work in terms of location, time, attendees, purpose and content. It was useful to focus on the 
clinical team’s fundamental purpose from the patients’ perspective and then map this to the purpose and 
tasks of the handover system, to identify value-adding steps. 
The team focused on the tasks important during handover, rather than on how handover was conducted, 
indicating that the information set transferred was of greatest clinical significance. The use of a well-defined, 
structured dataset has resulted in a more coherent approach to communication within the department and 
has increased clinical engagement. 
Following the implementation of weekly feedback concerning compliance with the agreed handover 
standards, clinical staff appeared to engage more with the project. As the attending consultant changes on a 
weekly basis, it proved difficult to provide feedback without it being potentially perceived as relating to 
individual performance; the heightened engagement may be due to weekly feedback engendering a degree 
of competition or pride. 
Emerging learning with respect to the local setting in site D identified the importance of ensuring that all 
members of a team are aware of the project and its aims, despite regular staffing changes; this can be 
difficult in the context of a single department in a large acute hospital where numerous demands are made 
on clinical teams and individual projects may compete for time, attention and ‘priority’ status. This difficulty 
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is exacerbated by the problems associated with finding a time when the whole team can meet; finding novel 
ways of communicating with the entire team would be useful. 
Perceived challenges 
Potential challenges to the project were associated with maintaining staffing at a level that was sufficient to 
support the project, and the inherent competition for time and resources between Safer Clinical Systems 
projects and other initiatives. This was exacerbated by the local political climate and the Trust facing an 
unprecedented financial situation with the requirement for all staff to focus efforts on reducing and 
containing cost whilst maintaining the safety and quality of its services. Embedding the use of the aide 
memoire within the clinical team once the current project funding has ceased is likely to be difficult. Making 
and sustaining improvement in an unstable environment was acknowledged to be an immense challenge.  
 
GENERAL LEARNING CONCERNING THE SAFER CLINICAL SYSTEMS APPROACH 
METHODOLOGICAL LEARNING 
Reviewing the Safer Clinical Systems project development processes identified several key learning points 
that may influence future methodologies. The University of Warwick support team concludes that: 
 In Phase 1 participants were involved in developing new approaches and tools, which necessitated 
continual modification of the projects. This iterative ‘trial-and-error’ approach to the early stages of the 
specific projects facilitated adult learning. However it led to frustrations concerning the speed of project 
progression and difficulties for support staff trying to move the project forward without a clear 
direction. It would be optimal to identify which elements of the iterative approach should be 
maintained to ensure learning by exploration and identify those that can be superseded based on the 
different requirements in Phase 2.  
 The new areas of Safer Clinical Systems (such as human factors, leadership and safety engineering 
approaches) should be front-loaded into a concentrated learning period in Phase 2.  
 The differing nature of the Safer Clinical Systems projects meant that implementation of a unified data 
collection system was not appropriate. Future projects should continue to use local data collection 
systems, unless projects become more closely aligned.   
 The use of Safety Improvement Cases facilitated broader assessment of project success, by allowing 
narrative reporting of aspects of the systems approach that would not be detected by quantitative 
measures.  
 Learning was often more valued when conducted in small groups or on site. 
 The use of a zoom-in-zoom-out approach, where the project’s implications and impact were assessed 
across all levels of the organisation, increased understanding. Use of this approach at an earlier stage 
may have promoted wider learning.  
 The use of mitigation maps and the acknowledgement of safety barriers were seen as value-adding 
steps. 
 Sites often had existing safety improvement initiatives in place and imposing a set process for the Safer 
Clinical Systems programme may have created tensions at the sites. 
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EMERGING LEARNING 
A number of common themes of emerging learning were raised by the Safer Clinical Systems programme 
teams at the different sites: 
The Safer Clinical Systems ethos 
 The Safer Clinical Systems programme facilitates widespread understanding of how system weaknesses 
can increase the risk associated with human factors. Appreciation of such associations enables 
individuals to view errors differently and focus efforts on identifying factors that contributed to the 
error rather than the error itself.  
 Simple interventions can have a big impact; however, the simplicity of an intervention does not 
necessarily mean that implementation is easy or that they will be sustainable. 
 The Safer Clinical Systems process aims proactively to identify and manage latent points of failure in a 
system. Such proactive risk management methods are more powerful than reactive methods, and the 
resulting processes are transferable between settings and situations.  
 The Safer Clinical Systems approach can enhance existing methodologies and individual learning. 
However, key skills such as human factor analysis and situational awareness take time to develop and 
observation (a key assessment tool) is time consuming. 
 The Safer Clinical Systems programme should not be viewed as a time restricted project but should be 
used to embed resilient and reliable systems that promote timely, high-quality patient care and safety. 
Achieving real improvements in safety culture and standards takes time and continuing work. 
Engendering a safety culture 
 Having motivated staff at all organisational level, is crucial when developing safe systems. Managerial 
support and involvement is important for the success and implementation of change. As Safer Clinical 
Systems support staff have no management authority for the clinical team or system being improved, 
change was bought about through facilitative leadership. From the outset this involved co-designing the 
purpose, aims, scope and potential solutions with stakeholders. This will hopefully ensure that the 
improvements made are sustainable. 
 Collecting and analysing quantitative and qualitative data proved time and resource intensive. However, 
the clinical teams greatly valued having timely data to feed back on process and system performance. 
Provision of such data promoted active participation in the projects. 
 Safer Clinical Systems learning was often generic and applicable to a wide range of safety projects; this 
facilitates knowledge transfer both horizontally across teams and projects and vertically within the 
hierarchy of the organisation. 
 Developing cross-organisational working practices takes time, resources and effort but is invaluable; 
building relationships supports integrated working across boundaries and beyond the initial project 
scope. Developing a culture of transparency and sharing of information across teams, services and 
organisations is essential for the success of the Safer Clinical Systems approach. 
Training and education 
 Educational interventions should be concentrated in the early stages of a project. 
 Detailed, thorough training regarding the human factors associated with risk would be beneficial. 
© University of Warwick  Page 15 of 29 
 
 Training to promote team working was highly appreciated and should be made available to as wide an 
audience as possible within each site.  
 Site awareness training would support wider adoption and transferability of the Safer Clinical Systems 
principles. The involvement of executives and key influencers in training would help facilitate adoption 
at the site. 
 Learning about the applicability of Safer Clinical System tools should be conducted within projects. 
 Different groups within teams have different training requirements and provision should not take a one-
size-fits-all approach. 
Measuring safety 
 It is difficult to show a causal link between reliability and harm. Limitations are associated with using 
numerical indices to demonstrate safety as: a low number of incidents does not necessarily reflect good 
safety culture; and the number of incidents seen cannot be used to estimate the likelihood of an 
incident occurring in the future. There is a need to develop an argument to address whether an 
improved safety culture leads to genuine and recognisable safety improvements.  
 The lack of evidence to confirm that improving the reliability of a system actually reduces harm or saves 
money puts pressure on improvement teams when working in a financially pressured climate. 
 Safety Improvement cases allow the portrayal of more complex arguments than simple data, allow 
discussion of risk minimisation and harm reduction and also allow  the uncertainty of  causal 
relationships to be explained. 
 
CONTEXTUAL LEARNING 
The exploratory nature of Phase 1 of the Safer Clinical Systems programme provoked discussion around 
defining and understanding what a system is, and on subsequently recognising how an improved system 
relates to measurable patient harm. The link between improved systems and patient harm proved a difficult 
concept for many involved in the Safer Clinical Systems programme. Whether an improved safety culture 
leads to improved safety is difficult to prove, requiring that an improvement from a baseline measurement 
of safety indicators follows an intervention. In most situations quantitative data are lacking and 
demonstration of safety improvements generally relies on qualitative evidence and an intuitive conviction 
that the process must achieve benefits. In addition in the wider organisational context, the beneficial effects 
of a specific intervention may be masked by those ensuing from other safety initiatives. 
The more usual problem-based approaches to improving safety typically focus on harm (and measuring 
harm) and the identification of a direct causal relationship between a specific action and an event. However, 
the resulting point improvements within the system are often either unsustainable due to other influences, 
or shift the problem to another part of the system. A key learning outcome from Phase 1 was that system-
level working is undoubtedly the required approach but is complex and challenging, both in its 
implementation and in the presentation of its impact.  
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LEARNING ON ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT AND CHANGE – THE KEY ISSUES 
Undertaking a safety project within a larger programme, such as Safer Clinical Systems, will inevitably be 
considered within the context of a particular organisation at a specific time. The problems, pressures and 
priorities of the organisation will shape how they perceive Safer Clinical Systems projects as matching 
strategic goals. A local Safer Clinical Systems team will need to take this into account to align their goals with 
those of the organisation. Experience at the Phase 1 sites suggests that there are four critical elements to 
this process, involving: 
1. Board commitment. 
2. Engagement of senior clinicians and understanding of the working culture. 
3. Leadership for change and innovation. 
4. Linking with existing and emerging  local and national priorities 
In order to be successful in each of these elements, a prerequisite is for the Safer Clinical Systems team to 
have internal clarity of focus concerning the objectives and changes needed to achieve goals; in Phase 1 this 
sense of clarity gradually strengthened for the individual pilot sites as work continued. There is considerable 
value in focusing effort to build in clarity earlier so that other aspects of managing the project can be tackled 
effectively. 
 BOARD COMMITMENT 
System level change can be far-reaching and involve many participants. It is therefore vital that the Board is 
committed and backs the change. The current NHS focus on patient safety means that it is relatively 
straightforward to obtain Board sign-up to safety projects; however this can be at a superficial level and the 
Board may not fully appreciate what is involved in projects such as Safer Clinical Systems. It is key that any 
Safer Clinical Systems team engages with and educates its Board to ensure that they understand: 
1. The nature of systems-based change and how this differs from projects targeting a specific issue in 
requiring change in many aspects of the system. Most NHS Boards like projects that deliver results, 
impact and visibility in a short timeframe. The nature and timescale of system change needs to be fully 
appreciated by Board members to ensure their continued commitment across the duration of the 
project and beyond. 
2. That systems-based change is proactive, in that it seeks to eliminate an identified risk in the system that 
is a precursor to actual harm. Boards are often more used to a reactive approach that establishes 
procedures to counter an identified and measured harm. The Safer Clinical System approach seeks to 
establish systems that minimise risk, rather than dealing with rare safety incidents. For this reason, 
education needs to counteract the pervasive acceptance within many Trusts of error as ‘situation 
normal’.  
3. That Safer Clinical Systems initiatives are more substantive than usual improvement methodologies. 
Improvements resulting from more reliable and safer systems should be seen as a component within 
the overall process of organisational change. 
As part of the educative process it is important to have a clear idea of what the Safer Clinical Systems team 
requires of Board members. The Board can become a significant source of influence but needs to understand 
the task and the team’s expectations of it. 
© University of Warwick  Page 17 of 29 
 
Phase I of the Safer Clinical Systems programme specifically targeted the medical director for executive 
engagement. In retrospect the failure to engage other executives, may have blocked or slowed progress and 
spread. The consensus view from Phase I was that a broad level of awareness of the initiative by executive 
directors and close involvement of an executive lead would be beneficial.  
CLINICIAN ENGAGMENT AND UNDERSTANDING THE WORK CULTURE 
A Safer Clinical Systems programme will impact upon most if not all personnel working in the targeted 
clinical area. Many (potentially senior) clinicians may be asked to make radical changes to their working 
practices and service delivery. As such, it is vital that clinicians engage with the Safer Clinical Systems project 
from the outset. Clarity of purpose is vital at this stage, as it is counter-productive to seek clinician 
engagement if the objectives are unclear and the required changes not identified. 
Metrics exist to assess the level of clinical engagement overall and many organisations now use them to 
prospectively characterise the existing culture within their work setting. The working culture of different 
professional groups may vary, and it is important to understand their values and drivers to enable 
acceptance of a new way of working by a critical mass of personnel. 
As the Safer Clinical Systems approach develops it is important to identify champions (especially clinical), 
who can present the case for an intervention and influence the behaviour of others. A particular challenge 
with the Safer Clinical Systems programme is that all team members and many of their organisation need to 
engage to effect whole-system change; an isolated champion or small team may not always be able to 
achieve results. 
LEADERSHIP FOR CHANGE AND INNOVATION 
Implementing change is always challenging, as it typically asks people to work differently and be comfortable 
with the unfamiliar; overcoming resistance to change is integral to the Safer Clinical Systems approach. 
Effective leadership is vital to facilitating the changes required by Safer Clinical Systems projects, as it 
provides direction and focus to create cohesive effective teams and influences staff in other areas who may 
be indirectly affected by the process of change. The Safer Clinical Systems team needs to ensure that it 
understands the leadership requirements of a particular project and is equipped to fulfil it. 
 
OTHER EVIDENCE OF WHETHER SAFER CLINICAL SYSTEMS PROJECTS 
IMPACTED ON THE SAFETY APPROACH  
The Safer Clinical Systems programme received overwhelming support from the sites, which recognised the 
impact projects had on their approach to safety. Safer Clinical Systems projects integrated with existing 
safety initiatives to varying degrees; site A fully integrated their project within the existing Improving Care 
System; site B developed a new programme that built on previous improvements within pharmacy.  
A short questionnaire to sites showed that they believed that the Safer Clinical Systems programme had a 
major impact on the way they worked both as individuals and to a lesser but significant degree as an 
organisation. The questionnaire addressed a range of domains including: trust and respect of colleagues, 
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priority of and commitment to safety, willingness to take risks to test ideas, and the likelihood of evaluation 
of adverse incidents. 
Interviews undertaken in April 2010 demonstrated that the Safer Clinical Systems programme had a 
significant impact on the way clinical teams and their organisations approached safety, with sites reporting 
changes in culture and behaviour. In some cases the change seemed to extend beyond the core clinical team 
e.g. in site D clinicians used the handover core dataset to improve presentations and referrals; in site C 
administrative staff became engaged in the patient safety agenda; in site B a range of pharmacy staff 
became aware of safety and risk factors, and medication interruptions and IT issues became recognised as 
safety factors rather than work irritations. Eighteen of 20 interviewees agreed or strongly agreed that 
patient safety had integrated better into their working practices. Other positive effects were perceived as an 
improved safety culture, organisational learning, and clinical engagement with safety. Project participants 
agreed that the Safer Clinical Systems initiative introduced them to new aspects of safety, at a new level of 
complexity. It was recognised that improving safety is not simple and should not be over-simplified if 
sustainable change is to influence safety at the organisational level; the Safer Clinical Systems approach 
should not be sold as an easy fix, but should be promoted based on the benefits of its wider organisational 
implications. 
 
LINKS WITH OTHER SAFETY INITIATIVES 
Patient safety has become a national priority and the Safer Clinical Systems programme is only one of a 
number of initiatives. 
In England the Patient Safety First campaign is being rolled out and consists of a large number of very 
focussed interventions. Other initiatives have led to the implementation of care bundle approaches or 
specific interventions, and have been identified as characteristic of safety-conscious organisations. These 
approaches are similar to the SPI, which has the added advantage of considering leadership and human 
factors. In Scotland, the SPI is being rolled out across all Health Boards as the Scottish Patient Safety 
Programme. 
The NHS Institute’s Safer Care Programme (including the Leading Improvement in Patient Safety component) 
is undertaking training in human factors and reliability, and implementing a greater focus on leadership; 
however there is less emphasis on broader safety awareness, project-based learning and use of various tools 
and interventions. 
In site D, safety initiatives are now part of a Strategic Health Authority programme of safety linked to the 
national Patient Safety First campaign, delivered in partnership with the Institute for Health Improvement 
and part-funded by The Health Foundation. A test of the applicability of the Safer Clinical Systems approach 
may be to see if it can act to support the wide range of projects being implemented in the site.  
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KEY LEARNING TO INFORM FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
Work to date has allowed Safer Clinical Systems sites to undertake a safety improvement project and learn 
about the systems approach to patient safety. This has facilitated proof-of-concept of the Safer Clinical 
Systems approach and identified components key to the programme. Some components are undergoing 
continued testing at the end of Phase 1. Work in Phase 2 will aim to further to refine key concepts and 
approaches, and evaluate and develop them further to achieve widespread applicability. 
Phase 1 might be characterised, both in focus of activity and learning outcomes, as: 
 Developing a trial-and-error approach to the use of diagnostic tools, which has helped to describe and 
understand system processes. Though time is required for this type of experimentation, a more 
structured approach using a reduced, consolidated and structured set of prescribed diagnostic tools is 
required for Phase 2.  
 Promoting recognition of the relationship between system-level work and risk as an intermediary to 
harm. This has resulted in an important advance in thinking, by increasing appreciation of the inherent 
existence of risk in an operational system that could lead to harm. As a consequence the optimal 
approach to safety management is proactively to seek and identify risk and then build more reliable 
systems to reduce or eliminate it, to prevent harm occurring in the longer term. The growing 
appreciation of this position could be considered as an incremental change in safety culture. 
 A consequence of the time required for exploratory aspects of Phase 1, was that less time and attention 
could be given to implementing interventions. The nature of the defining and diagnosing processes has 
meant that sites have not always known until well into the project what they need to do to re-frame 
their systems. Phase 2 will focus on demonstrating change as interventions will take time to implement 
and test. 
Phase 2 would need to build on these key learnings from Phase 1, ensuring that new sites understand the 
overall vision of improving patient safety at organisational level. Sites will need to be fully aware of the 
critical assumptions of SCS, namely:  
 That safety cannot be achieved when unreliable systems exist. 
 That risk is inherently greater in unreliable systems.  
 That proactively identifying and managing risk by improving (and measuring) the reliability of the 
system is necessary. 
 That the link between system change and specific forms of patient harm is likely to be indirect and will 
take time to demonstrate.  
The objectives of Phase 2 of the Safer Clinical Systems programme involve promoting understanding and 
acceptance of these key assumptions and using them in an operational context to drive system change and 
engender a safety culture. 
A novel feature of the Safer Clinical Systems approach is that it aims to identify risk as well as harm, a 
complex undertaking that is difficult to quantify. Local priorities and external pressures can compromise this 
goal and tend to promote an approach that reacts to harm. The causal link between harm, reliability and risk 
may be difficult to establish and the impact of environmental and cultural factors may not be obvious. To 
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counteract these potentially counterproductive pressures, the advantages of identifying risk needs to be 
emphasised in terms of prevention of a broader range of harm than targeted by traditional approaches. 
Systems theory advocates that feedback encourages the development of adaptive and emergent processes. 
The use of feedback loops to raise awareness of errors and encourage learning has been shown to be 
important in both in previous projects and during Phase 1 of the Safer Clinical Systems programme. The 
dynamic nature of risk and the need for continuous measurement and feedback should be integrated into 
the design of future Safer Clinical Systems projects. 
LOCAL AND NATIONAL INFLUENCES 
In order to optimise Safer Clinical Systems projects and the programme as a whole, safety improvement 
teams needs to understand local and national drivers that can affect their working. Force field analysis is a 
technique used to explore potential barriers and enablers to implementation, sustainability and spread of a 
piece of work. When undertaken by the Safer Clinical Systems teams force field analysis was seen as 
beneficial, and it was suggested that the methodology should be undertaken at an early stage and repeated 
throughout the programme to ensure that a project was supporting and responding to local priorities.  
A continuing challenge identified during Phase 1, was the differing perspectives of individuals as to the 
relative importance of the project and programme. To achieve wider benefits, the Safer Clinical Systems 
approach advocates that learning need to occur in various directions: 
 Vertically to the management team and influential senior individuals. 
 Vertically and horizontally to the broader group of individuals whose work is influenced by the project. 
 Horizontally to teams undertaking other safety improvement projects. 
 Centrifugally by means of social and professional networks. 
Some sites had wider awareness of the benefits of the Safer Clinical Systems approach, and embedded their 
project within existing work systems or used zoom-in-zoom-out methodologies to assess implications and 
impact at all organisational levels.  
TIME SCHEDULES 
Phase one of the Safer Clinical Systems programme did not adhere to its original timetable. This is not 
unusual for a project that uses a new approach and aims to show proof-of-concept, as the challenges and 
areas of exploration cannot be predefined. In retrospect the programme could have developed and 
progressed more quickly, had it been more restrictive in its remit and methodology and the objectives more 
tangible. If a project is too diffuse the goals may prove unachievable or progress more slowly than expected; 
if too specific and focussed the benefits the Safer Clinical Systems programme has over other campaigns may 
be lost.  
However experience did show that some Safer Clinical Systems components benefit from time, such as: 
1. Building the appropriate team and allowing the development of trust and mutual respect. 
2. Thorough diagnosis of project goals and approaches. 
3. Relationship building, particularly across organisational barriers. 
4. Learning new techniques, tools and approaches and overcoming inherent suspicion of them. 
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5. Developing an open culture that allows free discussion of issues. 
6. Working with data that is not geared to the needs of a safety improvement programme. 
7. Integrating safety improvement projects into existing improvement, governance and other internal 
structures. 
8. Engaging a wide body of staff. 
9. Building staff confidence to encourage them to influence organisational safety.  
Learning from Phase 1 suggests there should be clear goals regarding the broader system issues and how far 
they extend. The progression required to move from micro-system projects to whole system change may 
have been too great for Phase 1, and careful consideration needs to be given to future developments to 
ensure projects are manageable but remain challenging and rewarding. 
 
THE EVOLVING APPROACH TO SAFER CLINICAL SYSTEMS 
Most safety improvement programmes for healthcare have been developed by focusing on specific safety 
issues and have involved using defined interventions such as care bundles. The Safer Clinical Systems 
programme was developed to take a new approach. It has combined learning from improvement science 
and safety engineering and applied these to patient safety. Many improvement approaches are now being 
used in healthcare, including lean thinking and six sigma. Techniques originally used in manufacturing have 
been adopted by healthcare, although this has initially resulted in a bias for adopting the tools and 
techniques rather the philosophy behind them. For example, lean thinking focuses on approaches to 
maximise customer value while minimising waste, and develops this as a way of working to improve quality 
and efficiency. In other sectors (such as the petrochemical industry) safety engineering has developed into a 
science of testing and system evaluation to minimise risk and thereby reduce harm; where significant risk is 
present in a system, a formalised, prospective approach to safety is taken. The Safer Clinical Systems 
programme has begun to combine the approaches of improvement and prospective safety management, 
and to apply them to the healthcare setting. The overall aim is to reduce risk and harm to patients by 
proactively improving system reliability.  
The Safer Clinical Systems programme adopted an evolving approach to its component projects, which 
specified that: 
1. Any problem needs to be carefully diagnosed and the level of associated risk or harm should be 
quantified before deciding on actions. 
2. Whenever possible the system should be stabilised and variation reduced before undertaking risk 
management initiatives. 
3. Risk should be proactively identified. 
4. Once risk is controlled then resilience should be developed, to ensure that the system can cope with 
new and recognised threats. 
5. Trust strategy, definition of priorities and use of a suitable approach are important components of 
system change. 
6. Leadership, staff engagement and effective project management are important components of system 
change. 
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METHODOLOGY FOR PHASE 2 
The methodology for Phase 2 of the Safer Clinical Systems programme will include: defining and describing 
the overall system of interest and the specific focus of study; and describing the vision/approach to building 
safer systems. 
DEFINING AND DESCRIBING THE SYSTEM  
The first aspect of defining and describing the system to be studied in Phase 2 involves identifying and 
specifying (with evidence) the focus (and boundaries). 
Based on learning from Phase 1, work with sites will apply a systematic approach to improving the safety and 
reliability of certain agreed processes and systems that support clinical care. These have been chosen based 
on evidence from Phase 1 that shows them to: be of great interest to the NHS, often be unreliable, contain 
inherent risk and system defects/failures, and potentially contribute to patient harm.  
The two agreed options for sites will be to create in a sustainable way:  
 Safe, reliable prescribing in patient pathways.  
 Safe and reliable transfer of clinical information along patient pathways.  
These systems have been selected as they are relevant to a wide variety of patient pathways and are 
recognised as high-risk areas in terms of patient safety. As they are relevant to numerous patient settings, 
they will facilitate assessment of the transferability and generalisability of the interventions, tools and 
processes that are developed.  
Secondly, how this bounded process fits within the organisation and the wider healthcare system needs to 
be defined. Transfer of the process to a range of different clinical settings will facilitate exploration of how it 
adapts and what factors influence performance. The influence exerted by system factors may necessitate 
system-wide review and change. This aspect of the project in particular will advance understanding of the 
role of leadership and the development of a safety culture. 
DEFINING THE APPROACH TO BUILDING A SAFER SYSTEM  
The overall long-term vision of the Safer Clinical Systems programme is to promote the acceptance of 
an emerging definition of a safe clinical system as ’a clinical system that delivers value to the patient, is 
demonstrably free from unacceptable levels of risk and has the resilience to withstand normal variations 
and fluctuations .’ The overall approach to building a safer system recognises the ultimate goal of achieving 
resilience to unexpected challenges.  
Phase 2 of the Safer Clinical Systems programme aims to take teams through the first few steps in this 
journey of assessing/diagnosing, testing and implementing solutions.  
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THE SAFER CLINICAL SYSTEMS TOOLKIT 
Various tools and techniques were used at the sites during the course of the Safer Clinical Systems 
programme. Some were traditional improvement tools already in use at the sites; others were new to the 
teams and were usually practices from the safety engineering world. This resulted in the development of a 
core toolkit that can be used within the Safer Clinical Systems programme to increase understanding.  
A process map is a logical step-by-step representation of business activities showing key inputs and outputs. 
The process map is a basic tool for any improvement project and was used widely to understand high level 
issues. Process mapping was made more sophisticated by developments within the Safer Clinical Systems 
programme: Create and Detect maps enabled clear representation and exploration of the source of risk or 
harm. Swim Lane maps allowed staff to directly relate their work to safety issues and to identify safety 
defences. They also encouraged engagement and continued interest in the progress of individual projects; 
Mitigation and correction steps were introduced in recognition that a process occasionally goes off track and 
that it is important to have a rescue pathway, and has led to the development of Mitigation maps. 
Structured observation was widely used by sites as part of ongoing improvement work but its importance 
was emphasised by the Safer Clinical Systems programme. The Safer Clinical Systems programme developed 
the observation tool by emphasising that observers need to be trained to recognise parameters relevant to 
feedback processes. In addition, the need to observe the system environment and the approach to process 
was relatively new. The main issues with observation were the time needed and the difficulty in maintaining 
the high level of input needed for monitoring. The Safer Clinical Systems programme also made widespread 
use of interviews and focus groups both to establish the diagnosis and to validate findings and approaches; 
these proved key to maintaining clinical engagement and motivation. 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) was a new technique for all sites that was widely used. HTA enables a goal 
to be broken down into the subtasks required to achieve the goal; it serves as a basis for detailed risk 
analysis and ranking, and for failure mode analysis and predictive human error analysis. HTA was used to 
demonstrate where and why processes fail and where risk mitigation strategies or systems need to be 
introduced.  
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a process for the systematic identification of major 
vulnerabilities within a system. It provides a quantitative risk evaluation that can be used to prioritise 
threats. FMEA was new to sites but was widely used and well received; users reported that it facilitated both 
identification of major issues and their prioritisation. 
Fishbone analysis is used to identify and list the scale and scope of issues and problem areas, and was used 
as part of Safety Improvement Cases to display the numerous issues relating to the system under study; 
Fishbone diagrams help to present the complex and varied factors that affect systems. Fishbone analysis 
enabled teams to understand performance influencing factors (including teamwork, resource, clinical 
engagement and leadership) that link the clinical micro-system to wider organisational systems. During 
Phase 1, Fishbone analysis was usually implemented in the diagnostic phase but it may have been useful to 
continuously revisit it to understand the changing picture.  
Proactive Risk Monitoring (PRIMO) is a new tool that is still under development; it promotes organisational 
learning based on feedback concerning basic risk factors that is elicited at regular intervals. PRIMO aimed to 
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proactively understand risks to safety and effectiveness. PRIMO ensured staff engagement with the process 
of proactive risk identification. 
Various methods were used to assess safety culture and environmental background: the Manchester Patient 
Safety Framework (MaPSaF) is a tool used to help NHS organisations and healthcare teams assess their 
progress in developing a safety culture. MaPSaF was found to promote discussion but use was time 
consuming and the tool does not derive a measure that facilitate comparison; the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) questionnaire is used to assess organisational safety culture and was perceived 
as allowing monitoring but needed more coordination of the results; the Texas Safety Attitudes 
Questionnaire was found to assess individual perspectives and collate them into an overarching view. 
Force Field Analysis is a technique used to explore potential barriers and enablers of implementation, 
sustainability and spread of a piece of work. Early use of the technique and regular updates may help 
maintain focus and prioritise successful interventions. 
Safety Improvement Cases were introduced as a tool, to structure reporting and clarify interventions and 
purpose. They facilitated a more narrative reporting style, so that success could be assessed in terms of non-
measurable parameters. The discipline of completing and updating Safety Improvement Cases proved 
challenging but was important for maintaining project structure. Safety Improvement Cases facilitated a 
more balanced approach to defining problems and demonstrating improvement. 
Mechanisms to support reliability were introduced, these included: simple checklists and the development 
of SBAR-T where the standard SBAR process had a “teach back” added to ensure a focus for receipt of 
information and transmission of correct information (confirmed as an issue by WISER). 
It was clear that a defined set of tools should not be prescriptively applied to the Safer Clinical Systems 
programme. Evidence from Phase 1 indicated that the effectiveness of the process requires an 
understanding of what works best, for whom, and under what circumstances. Varying contexts and cultures 
should to be recognised and addressed according to their unique setting. The toolkit provides a selection of 
instruments that can be used for many purposes; the set described comprised some basic tools that sites 
may wish to use in the future. The Safer Clinical Systems programme facilitated the introduction of tools to 
site teams and the development new tools that help to understand a system and diagnose where errors or 
the risk of harm can occur.  
FACULTY DEVELOPMENT 
Key learning to support faculty development was gained during Phase 1: 
 Individuals within the Phase 1 sites considered themselves suited to supporting various Faculty roles, 
and many were keen to peer-assist new sites. 
 Few Safer Clinical Systems programme participants were enthusiastic to take on a topic expert role. 
 An in-depth knowledge of the evolving approach needed for the Safer Clinical Systems programme is 
considered obligatory for all involved in the faculty, to ensure that unique features of the approach are 
not lost. 
 Phase 1 sites could have made more use of the expertise in the faculty but there was also a desire for 
the support of external experts. 
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The Faculty will include external experts, who would be individuals involved in related initiatives with 
knowledge that would support the Safer Clinical Systems faculty; they may not be aware of key features of 
the Safer Clinical Systems programme in which case they would need training to support their faculty role.  
The plan for the faculty is to develop expertise from within the Phase 1 sites, to provide support to 
participants in Phase 2. This involvement could take the form of an individual with specific topic expertise, a 
generalist with knowledge of the wider Safer Clinical Systems programme, or a mentor for sites in their 
specific project. To date, faculty support has focused on increasing the knowledge of the team and their 
understanding of the evolving Safer Clinical Systems approach.  
Evidence from Phase 1 indicates that training should not be provided on a generic basis but in response to 
specific needs. The level of expertise in existing sites is thought to be sufficient to meet the current needs of 
the projects and the overall programme. Potential future training needs, to build additional expertise in a 
Phase 2 faculty, will be considered.  
 
SUMMARY 
A concluding statement from the WISER report (2010) specified that ’the contributing factors (to improved 
safety) suggest that a systems focus is required to improve the reliability of healthcare processes and patient 
safety’. Most safety improvement programmes have been developed around specific safety issues and 
involved closely defined interventions. The Safer Clinical Systems programme was developed to take a new 
approach that learns from improvement science and safety engineering aspects of risk management; where 
significant risk is identified in a system a formalised, prospective approach to safety is taken. The Safer 
Clinical Systems programme has begun to combine the approaches of improvement and prospective safety 
management and apply them to healthcare, to reduce harm and risk to patients by proactively improving 
system reliability. Phase one of the programme has also developed new tools, as well as the over arching 
new approach 
Phase 1 of the Safer Clinical Systems programme targeted healthcare systems believed to be vulnerable to 
the occurrence of safety issues. The systems of interest were assessed using a range of tools, to identify key 
areas of safety risk, asses reliability, and design focussed interventions to reduce the level of risk by 
improving the reliability. The project took an iterative approach to allow exploration of diverse issues in the 
context of both the system and the organisational environment. Assessment of the impact of the project on 
the system under study primarily aimed to confirm reliability. Phase 1 has demonstrated proof-of-concept 
for the approach, having shown preliminary evidence of the capacity to improve reliability in systems for: 
aspects of patient flow within the hospital environment, patient information transfer, patient handover 
between different care settings, and medication prescribing within the hospital environment, Phase 1 has 
also involved the generation of a considerable body of learning applicable to the broader Safer Clinical 
Systems programme; this learning will be used to guide progression of the programme into Phase 2, 
particularly in terms of refining methodological and measurement processes and the wider goal of 
engendering a sustainable safety culture at the organisational level. 
